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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial District Court In And For Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, Judge presiding.

As a result

of a trial held on March 7, 1978, the Court found that the
Appellant refused to submit to a chemical test pursuant to
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended).
(Record, 23-24).

The case was heard by the Court without

a jury.
The issue on appeal involves the interpretation of
Section 41-6-44.10, as amended by the 1977 Utah State LegislaturP..
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT

The '.:1lird Judicial District Court after nonjury trial entered an Order

upholding the decision

of the Drivers License Division

that Appellant re-

fused to submit to a chemical test, resulting in a
revocation of his driver's license.

The trial was

held pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code
Annotated, (1953, as amended), authorizing a de
novo review of the findings of the Department of
~".otor

Vehicles.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Third
Judicial District Court decision, and a permanent
reinstatement of his driving privileges.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On December 8, 1977, John Beck and his wife were
at Little America Restaurant for the purpose of having
dinner.

(Record, 31) .

They discovered that they had left

their checkbook at Lhe motel where they were staying on
North West Temple.

Appellant left his wife at the rest-

aurant and went to get the checkbook.

(Record, 32).

At approximately the interse'ction of Second South
and Third Pest, Salt Lake City, Utah, he was pulled over by
police officers.

(Record, 32, 46-67).

Officer Mark, the

arresting officer, observed the automobile making a right
hand turn and not returning to the right hand lane of traffic.

(Record, 46-47).

He also observed him holding onto

the door of his car, apparently
an odor of alcohol.

for support, and smelled

(Record, 53).

Officer Mark also

believed that Mr. Beck's speech was slurred, but later
admitted that Mr. Beck speaks like that all of the time.
(Record, 54) .
Field sobriety tests were administered.

Th.erecord

contains no evidence that the results of that test indicated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a state of intoxication.

(Record, 18-19, 47-48).

Never-

theless, he was placed under arrest for driving under

the

(Record, 12, 48-49).

influence of alcohol.

Upon being placed under arrest, Mr. Beck was very
(Record, 34, 50-51).

upset and hostile.

asked him if he would submit to a test.
read to him.

Officer Mark
His rights were

Mr. Beck replied "I'm a criminal; yeah, yeah,

yeah, I'm a criminal."

1

When asked if he wanted to take the

test, Er. Beck replied, "I don't know."

(Record 36, 49-50) ..

Officer Mark testified that he asked Mr. Beck to
submit to a breathalyzer test on these occasions before ar(Record, 50).

riving at the jail, and one time at the jail.

He testified that he read the statutory warning once and
explained, "the implied consent statute" to Mr. Beck in
his own words twice.

(Record, 50).

On at least two (2)

occasions, Mr. Beck replied, "I don't know", and the other
times said nothing.

(Record, 34, 50).

At no time was Mr. Beck taken to the breathalyzer
machine for the purpose of administering the test.

(Record,

36, 50).
Mr. Beck testified that he was upset at the officers
for arresting him, but at no time intended not to take the
test.

He believed the test would be administered after bein~

booked into jail.

(Record,

36, 38).

He told

1

he

w0rnilf1

at t'''
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booking desk that he had not yet had a breath test and
advised Larry Bench of Pre-trial Services of the same
fact.

(Record, 36-37, 57-58).
Mr. Beck has just moved to Utah, having lived

in the State of California for Twenty-three (23) years.
He believed, based upon publicity and talking to friends
in the State of California, that the tests were to be
administered by a chemist at booking.

He believed that

a refusal to take such a test would be.signified by signing a statement of refusal.

(Record, 37,38).

He became un-

cooperative with the officers after feeling he had passed
the field sobriety tests, but nevertheless being arrested.
(Record, 40).

He believed that he would be given the test

and that he could make the determination to take it after
he arrived at the jail.

(Record, 44).

Larry Bench interviewed Mr. Beck shortly after his
arrival at the jail.

(Record, 36-37, 59-60).

Mr. Beck

mentioned the breathalyzer to lk. Bench on several occasions,
expressing disbelief that he could be charged with drunk
driving without having taken a breathalyzer test.
5 7).

(Record,

Mr. Bench had no reason to believe that :1r. Beck was

refusing to take a breathalyzer test.

Mr. Beck initiated
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each conversation regarding the breath test.

(Record, 37,

58).

ARGUMENT
POINT I

APPELLANT CONSENTED TO A CHEMICAL TEST BY OPERATION OF LAW

Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, (1953
amended) provides:

"(a) Any person operating a motor
vehicle in this state shall be deemed
to have given his consent to a chemical
test or tests of his breath, blood,
or urine for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or in
actual physicial control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of
alcohol and any drug, and provided
that such test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe such
person to have been driving or in actual physicial control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of
alcohol and any drug .... " (Italics
added).
Clearly under Utah law, a valid consent to a c)1~:i1 ic
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test exists solely by virtue of the oneration of a motor
vehicle by the individual within this State.

No further

consent need legally be given, and a test may be administered based upon the "Implied Consent Law" unless that
imnlied consent is specifically revoked.

Hyde v. Darius,

549 P.2d 451 (1976).

POINT II

APPCLLANT DID NOT EXPRESSLY REFUSE TO
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST, THUS REVOK-ING THE LEGALLY OPERATIVE CONSENT AND
MAKING APPLICABLE THE FURTHER PROVISIONS OF SECTION 41-6-44.10 (b)
Section 41-6-44.lO(b) provides:

"If such person has been placed under
arrest and has thereafter been requested by a peace officer to submit to
any one or more of the chemical tests
provided for in sub-section (a) of this
section and refuses to submit to such chemic-oz test m• tests, such person shall be
warned bv a peace officer requesting the
test or ·tests that a refusal to submit
to the test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a
motor vehicle.
FollowiI1g this warning,
unless such person immediately requests
the chemical test or tests as offered by
o neacc oJ~1'icer be administered, no test
shall be given .... " (italics supplied).
A condition precedent to the operation of the warning
provisions of the statute and that the person request a test is a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
refusal.Library
Thus.
unless
the individual
toState
submit
Services
and Technology
Act, administeredrefuses
by the Utah
Library. to such
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

chemical test, the rest of the section is not applicable.
This Court has clearly set forth the requirements
of a refusal in Hyde v. Dori us, supra.

Hyde was arrested for

driving under the influence and, when asked to submit to a
chemical test, replied that she wouldn't listen and that the
police did not know what they were talking about.
of approximately five (5) minutes elapsed
and her alleged refusal.

A period

between her arrest

This Court, recognizing the efficacy

of the implied consent statute,stated:

"Under the circumstances here, four or
five minutes is not a reasonable time
within which to eXPect asentient consent
or refusal; particularly when the Court
found that, at the scene, Plaintiff was
upset, irritated and scared as a result of the accident and accompanying
events."
(italics added).
549 P. 2d at
452.
In this case, the record shows that Apuellantwas
irritated, upset and hostile as a result of having to interupt his dinner with his wife, leave her at the restaura:it,
and return to the motel to get their checkbook, and having
been arrested en route to the motel when he felt that it
was unjustified.

Appellants words and conduct clearly in-

dicate an uncertainty and can by no means be construed to
be an express refusal.

The record shows no indication that

Officer ,1ark advised the Appellant that he considered his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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silence or uncertainty to be a refusal.

The Appellant

believed that he had the right to make a final determination at the jail to the chemist and, that a refusal,
if given, would have to be expressed by him in writing.
The determinative statement by this Court on
the issue of refusal is still that which was set forth
in Hyde v. Dori us, supra.

There, the Court adopted the

language of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Bock,
328 P.2d 1065 (Idaho, 1958):

"By operating a motor vehicle in this
state the defendant is 'deemed to have
given his consent to a chemical test.'
The only way that he can withdraw that
consent is to expressly refuse the test.
So under our law if he neither refuses
nor consents, expressly, the test may
be made." 328 P.2d at 1072-73

This Court also sited Idaho law in Hyde v. Dorius,

.'upra, for the purpose of determing what constitutes express
refusal.

Mills v. Swanson, 460 P.2d 704 (Idaho, 1969) in-

volved a situation where Swanson had remained silent when
requested to take the test.

The Trial Court found that

silence was insufficient to constitute a refusal, and the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.

The Court concluded,
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"In the case at bar, the respondent
did not at any time expressly refuse to
take the test.
Expressly means indirect
or unmistakable terms.
Expressly means
declared and not merely left to implication.
Thus where an individual has
neither refused or consented, but for
some reason within the discretion of
the officer, the test is not administered, it cannot be said that there
was an express refusal to take the
test.
460 P.2d at 705 (citations
omitted).

It was clearly by implication only that Officer Mark coneluded that Mr. Beck refused to take the test.

At no ticc

was the test physicially offered to the Appellant.

In

addition, Mr. Beck had a misunderstanding of Utah law, relating to the administration of the chemical test a11d the
manner of an actual refusal.
short period of time.

All of this occurred

withi~

Hunter v. Dori us, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458

P. 2d 877 (1969) recognized that an individual has a "reasonable length of time in which to make up his mind" and to
consult counsel.
The 1977 Amendment to the Statute provides that
there shall

be no right to consult an attorney "for the

purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical te~t
or tests."
amended).

41-6-44. lO(g), Utah Code Annotated,
The Statute on its face,

(1953, as

thus contemplates

2

de
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_

mination whether to submit.

It does not require the

determination to be immediate or without contemplation.
Sub-section (b) of the Statute does require an immediate
request by the accused to take the test but only in the event
of a

p1-ieceedin~

refus-::.:.

No such refusal is present in this

case.
The holdings of Gassman v. Dori us, 543 P. 2ci 197
(1975) and Elliott v.

Dorius, 557P.2d 759 (1976) show that

a subjective understanding of the situation by the accused
person is necessary -::o justify a finding of refusal.
Gassman held that warning given approximately an hour and
fifteen minutes prior to the officer's request for the test
did not comply with the Statute.
temporaneouswarning did comply.

Elliott held that a conThe only logical assumption

from these two cases is that the Court recognized the importance of a subjective understanding of the situation by the
accused as a basis for finding a refusal.
The Court below specifically found that Appellant
had a misconception regarding the law.

(Record, 23-24).

In Calver v. State, 519 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1974), the Colorado Supreme Court, interpretating Statute similar to Utah's,
held that a refusal to take a chemical test based upon a mis-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rnderstanding is not a refusal within the statutory
meeting, and, therefore, no basis for revocation.
See also West v. DMV, 80 Cal. Reptr. 385 (1969).
Thus, even an express refusal may be invalidated
because of a misunderstanding.
instant case, the presence

TJhere, as in the

of a refusal is open

to conjecture, the presence of a misunderstanding
becomes even more important.
Clearly, because of the implied consent law,
the Appellant's consent existed at least until the time
of his arrest.

After booking, his conduct and words in-

dicated that the consent was not revoked, since he inquire(
about the breathalyzer test.

The period between the arrest

and booking shows no verbal refusal, and at the most, shows
uncertainty over whether or not to submit.
The 1977 Amendment did nothing to alter the law
with regard to what constitutes a refusal.

Therefore,

the holding of Hyde v. Dori us, s;,ccr2, is controlling.

CONCLUSION

The Court below erred in finding that Appellant
refused to submit to a chemical test and in affirming the
revocation of his driver's license.

The implied conscut
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was never revoked and the test should have been administered.

Even if an actual refusal had been made, based

upon a material misconception, it is invalid.
The decision of the Third Judicial District Court
should be reversed.
Dated this

(_'iJ'

day of June, 1978.

Respectfully submitted,

LITTLEFIELD, RITEHEY & COOK

Attorney for
Appellant.
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